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Abstract 
Evaluations of complex interventions are likely to encounter tensions between different 
methodological principles, and between the inherent causal rationality of evaluation and 
the messy complexity of real institutional contexts. Conceptualising evaluation as producing 
putatively authoritative evidence, we show how ‘legitimacy’ is a useful concept for 
unpacking evaluation design in practice.  A case study of service integration shows how 
different approaches may have unpredictable levels of legitimacy, based in contrasting 
assessments of their methodological acceptability and actual utility.  Through showing how 
practitioners resolved the tensions, we suggest that crafting a patchwork of different 
methodologies may be legitimate and effective, and can be seen as underpinned by its own 
pragmatic rationality.  However, we also conclude that the explanatory power of theory-
driven evaluation can be embedded in such an approach, both in elements of the patchwork 
and as an overarching guiding principle for the crafting process.  
Keywords 





The craft of evaluative practice: negotiating legitimate methodologies within 
complex interventions 
We’ve struggled with this evaluation; I’m not sure why we’ve struggled so much. 
Lyndon project sponsor 
Introduction 
Evaluation design rests on a plethora of issues: the evaluation’s purposes, its audience, the 
resources available and so on. These sit alongside often deep-seated beliefs in the value of 
different methodologies, each with their perceived strengths and weaknesses, protagonists 
and critics. In the context of evaluating complex social policy interventions (Sanderson 2000; 
Ling 2012), methodological choices are likely to be complicated and contested. In this paper 
our aim is to enhance understanding of how such choices are made, through what we 
conceptualise as dynamic meaning-making and learning processes, driven by multiple 
rationalities and with uncertain outcomes (Weiss 1979). Central to these is the ‘interplay’ 
between the technical aspects of evaluation design and the institutional and political nature 
of an evaluation’s context (Saunders 2012).  
Within a broadly neo-institutionalist approach (Sanderson 2000) we propose an innovative 
analysis which focuses on legitimacy: that is, whether an evaluation methodology can be 
taken as authoritative (Schmitter 2001). Despite legitimacy’s universal role in stabilising 
social processes (Zelditch 2001), the legitimacy of evaluation and evaluation-derived 
evidence is curiously absent as an explicit concern in the literature. Here we operationalise 
the concept through a constructivist framework, based on Beetham’s approach to the 
legitimation of political power (Beetham 1991). This takes us beyond simply recognising 
complexity, to provide analytical tools for dissecting negotiations over rival methodologies 
as processes of legitimation and de-legitimation, in which technocratic and political 
arguments are equally present.  
Our approach is motivated and informed by close observation of an adult social care 
integration programme and the delivery team’s struggle not just to evaluate it, but to work 
out how best to evaluate it. In common with many projects in this and other policy fields, 
the Lyndon Project1 involved multiple interventions in complex processes, driven by the 
assumptions that organisational change leads to better outcomes and (in the UK at least) 
reduced costs. Given the importance of these goals, developing appropriate evaluation 
methodologies has attracted much attention, especially as the evidence supporting these 
assumptions is very weak (Wistow and Dickinson 2012; Baxter et al. 2017).  
In the narrative presented below, we demonstrate how those involved successfully 
negotiated tensions over the legitimacy of different evaluation methodologies. We show 
that there were surprising and important differences between how people believed they 
                                                     
1 ‘Lyndon’ is a pseudonym.    
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ought to evaluate and what they believed was most effective, and in particular between 
rhetorical commitments to quantitative outcomes measures and actual practices of 
qualitative process understanding. Given that we share with many academics a ‘fascination’ 
with theory-driven evaluation (TDE) (Sullivan and Stewart 2006: 195) we were particularly 
interested in whether we could use our advisory role in the programme to base the 
evaluation in a coherent theory of change (ToC). We more-or-less failed, and the project’s 
final evaluation report was a patchwork of different kinds of evidence, which nevertheless 
commanded legitimacy.  
We conclude that understanding the constructed and contested legitimacy of evaluation 
methodologies in practice is useful, not only for explaining outcomes but also in identifying 
possible approaches to effecting change. Evaluations should be seen as complex 
interventions in themselves, and therefore one cannot expect single methodologies to be 
taken up unproblematically: in practice, different rationalities may be combined. This 
suggests an appreciation of evaluation as a craft (Sanderson 2000), with its own pragmatic 
rationality which privileges situated judgements about legitimacy and utility over 
methodological principle.   However, we argue that this still allows a significant role for the 
causal rationality of theory-driven approaches.  
Before presenting the story of the case, we consider further how issues of complexity and 
interpretation create challenges for evaluation, and set out our development of Beetham’s 
approach to analysing legitimacy.   
Rationalities of evaluation   
Evaluation practice has long been dominated by the quantitative assessment of outcomes, 
with the attribution of impact assessed as far as possible through designs inspired by the 
natural (and particularly biomedical) sciences - randomised controlled trials are the 
aspirational ‘gold standard’ (Lehmann 2015). These methodologies are rooted in a positivist 
‘modernist’ rationality (Sanderson 2000) which links: an understanding of policy making and 
bureaucracies as inherently rational (Adelman 1996); assumptions of linearity both in the 
processes being evaluated (Wagenaar and Cook 2003) and in the translation of evaluation 
‘findings’ into policy (Nutley et al. 2007); and a view of causality as (only) observable as the 
‘constant conjunction’ of events (Pawson and Tilley 1997). However, such approaches have 
struggled to provide useful accounts of the effectiveness of policy interventions in tackling 
complex social problems, producing poor explanations which neglect the complexity of the 
institutional context both of interventions and of evaluations (Sanderson 2000). Moreover, 
the problem is self-reinforcing, as the ‘everyday positivism’ of policy makers (Wagenaar and 
Cook 2003) sustains the predilection for modernist evaluation, despite its manifest failings.  
For many years (going back at least to Weiss and Rein in 1970) a section of the evaluation 
community has responded with methodologies which start from the principle that 
evaluation should go beyond assessing outcomes to provide causal accounts of the 
processes which explain how and why policy interventions work (or not) (Coryn et al. 2011). 
Modernist rationality has also been challenged by recent academic work drawing on neo-
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institutionalist approaches, which treat the rules and norms of organisational contexts as 
central to explaining the general failure of mainstream evaluation to create useful 
knowledge (Sullivan 2011; Saunders 2012; Højlund 2014). So, for instance, Saunders 
emphasises how the actual use (or not) of an evaluation is intimately connected with its 
usability – the extent to which its design ‘maximizes, facilitates or disables its potential use’ 
(Saunders 2012: 422) in a particular setting. These two strands converge in support of 
‘theory-driven evaluation’ (TDE) of various kinds (Chen 1990; Coryn et al. 2011), with the 
claim that TDE’s causal accounts are a better basis for design for usability, as they can 
support improved policies and programmes though organisational learning and increased 
accountability (Berriet-Solliec et al. 2014).  
There may, however, be a fundamental conceptual problem which undermines the utility of 
evaluation, common to modernist outcomes evaluation and TDE. Evaluation is essentially 
rationalist: the concept assumes that a goal-oriented intervention of some kind can be 
identified, and that there is a causal connection between intervention and observable 
change (Maxwell 2012). These assumptions may fail in the messy real world of policy and 
practice: in complex, dynamic, open systems causally relevant beginnings and effects of 
interventions may not be identifiable (Sanderson 2000; Ling 2012). Moreover, in a context 
of multiple, potentially competing interpretations it may not be possible to create a singular 
theory of change (ToC), a potentially fatal problem for any theory-based solution to the 
attribution problem (Sullivan and Stewart 2006). The strongest response is to abandon the 
possibility of defining and explaining outcomes altogether (Sullivan 2011) – clearly 
problematic in a policy world which demands such knowledge. But this seems unnecessary, 
and here we follow Sanderson in the search for ‘terra firma between…the illusion of 
certainty in modernist-rationalist order and…the danger of a pessimistic nihilism when 
facing chaos and complexity’ (2000: 445), though to a rather different destination.  
We distinguish two aspects of the ‘modernist-rationalist’ paradigm: its understanding of 
policy making and bureaucracies as rational processes and organisations (Adelman 1996) 
and the more fundamental issue of evaluation being inherently causal. Regarding the first, 
we need to recognise the differences within the broad family of TDE, which encompasses 
everything from positivist, quantitative causal modelling (Solmeyer and Constance 2015) 
through to interpretive approaches which see meaning-making as central to policy making 
(Pouliot 2014). The former are clearly vulnerable to the anti-modernist argument, but the 
latter perhaps are not, if their understanding of causality (needed to sustain evaluation as a 
concept) is compatible with their interpretivist epistemology.  
Here evaluation based philosophically in critical realism (CR) (Pawson and Tilley 1997) offers 
a way forward. CR conceptualises causality as based in inherent powers of agents and of the 
ideational and material structures which constitute the world. This intrinsically qualitative 
understanding stands in contrast to the positivists’ ‘successionist’ view of causality as that 
which links and explains (quantifiable) regularities between events (Maxwell 2012: 35). CR 
tends to be epistemologically interpretivist, at least insofar as human agency is concerned. 
In theorising a complex policy process, this allows differing interpretations and rationalities 
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to be treated as causal factors in their own right, rather than as conflicting positions which 
must be (but perhaps cannot be) reconciled in order to create a singular theoretical 
understanding of what is going on. We need, though, to be humble in our claims to have 
theorised a process (Sanderson 2000; Patton 2012), and strive not for full understanding but 
for a level of ‘practical adequacy’ (Sayer 1992) good enough for tentative explanation and 
modest prediction, and always open to revision2.  
However, causal theory-based approaches face more mundane challenges. TDE seems 
particularly resource-demanding, with extended engagement required for the intimate 
organisational knowledge and stakeholder involvement necessary to develop causal 
theories (Ling 2012; Ivaldi et al. 2015). It may thus not be practically feasible, particularly in 
the context of financial austerity (Sullivan and Stewart 2006; Montague and Porteous 2013). 
Further, while Ling argues that policy makers ‘should not be too disappointed when [an 
evaluator’s] answer begins with the words “it depends”’ (Ling 2012: 82) real world policy 
makers need usable, generalisable knowledge about the relationship between interventions 
and outcomes (Sullivan 2011).  
Sanderson’s own destination in the search for terra firma is to treat evaluation as a craft, 
involving ‘a range of methods appropriate to particular circumstances’ (2000: 450, emphasis 
added). Similarly Patton uses the analogy of judicial process to encourage an evaluator to 
use ‘conflicting and confused evidence, and [sort] it out as best they can to reach an 
informed and hopefully fair judgment based on the cumulative evidence’ (2012: 267). The 
suggestion appears to be that successful practice might involve pragmatic selection of 
methods without necessarily having any underlying single rationality beyond judgements of 
‘appropriateness’. What is not clear, however, is the basis for such selection: what guides 
evaluators when they make a ‘carefully balanced judgement in “constructing the intelligible 
picture”’ (Sanderson 2000: 449)?   
Legitimacy  
To address this we need a way of examining how and why different rationalities are 
manifested in practice. Here we turn to the concept of legitimacy, which is fundamentally an 
issue of whether or not a social practice fits into a system of norms: that is, a socially shared 
framework defining what is right and appropriate (Zelditch 2001)3. In the context of the 
legitimacy of power, Beetham (1991) argues that such judgements involve more than simply 
consent based on a belief in legitimacy (as Weber (1968 [1922] influentially claimed). 
                                                     
2 Sanderson (2009) suggestively links policy making in general (rather than evaluation) to American pragmatist 
philosophy. In terms of implications for method, the overlaps between critical realism’s ‘practical adequacy’ 
and Dewey’s work seem clear, as is their rejection of correspondence theories of truth. Whether other 
underlying ontological and epistemological commitments are compatible seems doubtful, but is an unfinished 
debate beyond the scope of this paper.  
3 Social practices are conceptualised not simply as actions, but as meaningful actions which are therefore 
intrinsically social and normative: recognition as meaningful involves categorisation and judgment (Barnes 
2001; Schatzki 2001).  
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Instead, he argues that the legitimacy of regimes rests on the exercise of power in 
conformity with a particular system of norms: a set of ‘established rules’; ‘shared beliefs’ 
which justify those rules; and the ‘express consent’ of those subordinate to the regime in 
question (Beetham 1991: 19). His approach has the advantages that it allows for 
explanatory accounts of contestation and change in the legitimacy of relations of power, 
and provides an analytical framework (the triads of rules, justifying beliefs and consent) 
which render the abstract concept of ‘legitimacy’ into something observable and 
researchable. 
While Beetham’s analysis has been criticised within political science as being simplistic in 
relation to the legitimation of regimes (O'Kane 1993), as a constructivist and institutionalist 
approach it seems very open to being developed for the analysis of multiple and competing 
legitimacy claims in complex contexts. Thus Connelly (2011)  and Lau (2013)  have shown 
how Beetham’s approach can be used in the context of local governance, to explore the 
issues of how different actors and policy processes are accepted and become influential. 
Here we suggest that the analytical framework can be pushed beyond political science’s 
concern with the legitimacy of actors and their exercise of power. By moving away from the 
Weberian idea that legitimacy is essentially and only about consent, Beetham introduces 
justification for rules on principled or abstract grounds (O'Kane 1993). This opens the way to 
use the framework to analyse other contexts in which judgements of the acceptability of 
power are made which draw on general principles, including those about the status of 
different forms of knowledge and the methodologies used to generate them. This would 
seem eminently suitable for an examination of evaluation practices, as these are - overtly at 
least – a way of creating authoritative knowledge about a process in order to guide further 
action.  
‘Overtly’ is important: evaluations can serve purposes and functions beyond this 
instrumental use (Saunders 2012; Højlund 2014). Weiss (1979) discusses ‘political’, often 
unspoken, uses of evidence in the policy process such as neutralising opponents and 
deflecting criticism. In some cases evaluating, and being seen to evaluate, may be the most 
important, symbolic purpose (Saunders 2012), rather than the production of knowledge. 
However, the instrumental use is part of the core meaning of the concept of evaluation, in a 
way these other functions are not.  
Applying Beetham’s framework means that if an evaluation methodology is to become 
legitimate it will need to: follow accepted rules, which are justifiable according to 
sufficiently widely shared beliefs, and command sufficient consent by those who are 
involved in the process. ‘Justifying beliefs’ is the most complex of these criteria, 
encompassing both process and outcomes. Legitimacy will rest on a mixture of people’s 
(often taken-for-granted) beliefs about what kinds of processes generate valid knowledge, 
and the kinds of data they think they need to achieve their goals for the evaluation. So while 
we might expect, for instance, randomised trials to command legitimacy in an ‘everyday 
positivist’ policy setting because of assumptions about ‘good science’, an academic 
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evaluator in the same setting might attempt to follow the rules for producing a ToC, justified 
by the belief that causal models are essential for generating useful knowledge.  
But legitimacy is not just a matter of the in-principle justifiability of design: it is also a 
pragmatic matter of whether a methodology is acceptable (i.e. consented to by those 
involved) because it produces practically usable knowledge (cf. Saunders 2012). Further, the 
issue of whether beliefs are ‘widely-shared’ enough to justify a choice is made more 
complex by the importance of assumptions about others’ beliefs in creating and sustaining 
legitimacy (Johnson et al. 2006): judgements about usability are likely to depend on whether 
an evaluator thinks their audience will accept a proposed methodology.  
Beetham makes it clear that legitimacy requires stability across the three ‘dimensions’ of 
rules, justifiability and consent, but that where alternative rules or justifying principles exist 
it is always open to contest. While his concern is principally with challenges to a regime, 
here we are interested in how competing methodologies fare. The previous section 
suggested that while modernist rationality may be dominant, there is no single evaluation 
methodology which commands universal consent, particularly given the many functions 
which evaluation can fulfil and the likelihood that different stakeholders will have different 
goals and ‘frames of reference’ (Saunders 2012: 430). In the context of evaluating complex 
interventions the possibility for disagreement over design and implementation is therefore 
likely to be high.  
We seek to explain why an evaluation is carried out in a particular way – why one 
methodology is chosen rather than another - through examining the triads of governing 
rules, justifying beliefs and levels of consent which different approaches command. None of 
this can be predicted a priori. Such examination means paying attention to actual practices 
(Sullivan 2011), and an open mind about what constitutes a legitimating rule or belief. We 
thus avoid normative assumptions about what is legitimate (Hurrelmann et al. 2007): in 
particular, we do not assume that legitimacy derives from intrinsic qualities of certain 
methodologies or the force of better argument. A convincing case for the production of 
‘better’ (i.e. more valid or functional) knowledge will not necessarily give a methodology 
legitimacy and lead to its adoption.  
The case study: integration of services for vulnerable adults in Lyndon  
We turn now to the case study. As a single case linked to conceptual development, this is 
intended to enable the reader to ‘see the world in a new way’ (Siggelkow 2007: 23) through 
showing how Beetham’s abstract concepts are manifested in the real world. Our claim here 
is for new middle-range theory (Merton 1967; Ling 2012), as we demonstrate the 
significance of legitimacy judgements in the practice of evaluating a complex intervention, 
and so in explaining the way an evaluation evolves as methodological choices are made. 
While the specifics are, of course, unique to the context, we are suggesting that similar 
processes may well be found elsewhere, particularly as the case exemplifies many 
contemporary challenges for policy evaluation: overlapping initiatives in complex, dynamic 
organisational settings, with insufficient resources committed for evaluation.  
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Between 2011 and 2013 the Lyndon Project aimed to integrate adult care services on a 
housing estate of some twelve thousand inhabitants, located on the periphery of an English 
city. The project’s starting ‘hypothesis’ was that integrating place-based resources and 
services and focusing on building resilience, would improve service quality and so impact on 
the health, wellbeing and independence of older and vulnerable people (Project Mandate, 
July 2011)4. It would also reduce costs. Led by the local authority’s adult social care 
commissioning team, it brought together council departments and organisations from the 
health and community sectors. The project comprised six workstreams5, organised through 
a management group (headed by a ‘project lead’ assisted by the ‘project manager’) and 
overseen by a ‘Project Board’ of senior local authority and National Health Service (NHS) 
executives and mid-level managers of concurrent integration projects, chaired by a senior 
officer as ‘project sponsor’.  
From the outset the project had multiple functions. Alongside delivering substantive 
benefits to Lyndon’s residents it was also a pilot, simultaneously learning how to integrate 
services and developing a business case for taking the approach forward elsewhere in the 
city. It was watched particularly closely by the managers of a much larger service integration 
project: Getting It Right was a partnership of the local authority and NHS which aimed to 
save £60 million annually through reducing unscheduled admissions of older people to 
hospital. Evaluation for both accountability and learning was thus at its core, but without 
dedicated resources apart from limited staff time. Neither was a methodology established 
at the outset: like other activities evaluation was experimental and emerged over time, and 
turned out to be complex and contested. This may well also be typical of myriad initiatives 
undertaken by local authorities and even at central government level, away from the well-
resourced evaluation of flagship policies. It provided an environment in which policy 
makers’ views on different evaluation methodologies became very visible, in the absence of 
an imposed evaluation framework and professional evaluators6.    
Our ability to observe arose from our position within the project. Formally this was based on 
an agreement between the local authority and our university, for us to ‘support the [Lyndon 
Project] through … being a critical friend to the Project Board’ (Local Integrated Services 
Project Agreement, August 2011). This gave both of us positions on the management group, 
and Connelly membership of the Project Board. Although we had no formal status as 
evaluators, in the context of the team’s uncertainty over how to evaluate the project our 
                                                     
4 To preserve anonymity, statements such as this one are not attributed to traceable sources. The titles are 
genuine to indicate the nature of the source. 
5 The ‘workstreams’ were Engagement & Communication, Market Development, Integrated Health & Social 
Care, Multi-agency Approach & Community Interventions, Intergenerational Intervention, and Evidence Base & 
Evaluation.  
6 The evaluation literature is unsurprisingly biased towards situations in which evaluators are involved, yet 
practitioners must be carrying out their own evaluations everywhere, all the time, even if they are not always 




academic understanding of evaluation methodologies was increasingly drawn on. We had 
no authority to impose, but we advised, supported and informed as the practitioners 
developed their approach.  
As researchers this allowed us to build up relationships of trust and friendship which gave us 
close access to the project (cf. Bjørkeng et al. 2009), spanning the two and a half years from 
the project’s inception to the disbandment of the Board and the mainstreaming of some 
activities. For this paper we have drawn on digital recordings of: a set of eight interviews 
early in the project with the workstream leads, project lead, sponsor and manager; two sets 
of interviews with Board members (six from mid-project and thirteen towards the end); nine 
ad hoc meetings with the sponsor, project lead and Evaluation workstream lead; and almost 
all the steering group and management team meetings (thirty meetings altogether). We also 
have detailed notes from informal meetings and conversations with the lead and sponsor, 
along with field notes taken in and after meetings organised by associated projects within 
the authority and local NHS. The analysis also draws on the local authority’s minutes of the 
project management group and Board meetings, and a number of project documents 
(referenced in the text e.g. the Project Mandate cited above.)  Analysis of this material was 
done thematically, drawing broad themes from Beetham’s framework and coding 
inductively within these (Braun and Clarke 2006). We were looking for enactment and 
discussion of rules, justifications of those rules, and for consent and dissent, including not 
only people’s own practices and positions on these, but also their beliefs about and 
attitudes towards those of others.  
Given the nature and purpose of this paper, a number of methodological points need to be 
acknowledged. Firstly, while this is not an evaluation of the project, there are clear parallels 
with a theory-driven evaluation in our analysis, in that we are presenting a theoretical 
explanation of a complex intervention. This reflects our own critical realist perspective, and 
our aim to develop ‘practically adequate’ causal accounts of complex processes, based in 
part on the interpretation of participants’ accounts. Secondly, given our concern with how 
evaluation is presented, as well how it is carried out, we note our choice to present a 
narrative. Given the diversity of positions we uncovered, which points to the robustness of 
the methodology (Maxwell 2012), narrative is useful as it provides coherency based on 
causal links between events (Dodge et al. 2005; Abell 2009) and at the same time uses 
participants’ understandings of how and why things were done to show how a project and 
its context are interwoven (Costantino and Greene 2003). We suggest that the validity of 
the analysis arises not just from the use of a diversity of sources, systematic coding and so 
on, but also in particular from our close engagement with the project. Our grasp of the 
situation was continuously checked and challenged by the practitioners, and its accuracy 
was evidenced by our engagement being sustained as the project was extended and by the 
way our views and advice were taken increasingly seriously.  
Finally, the ethical dimensions of validity were closely considered. We were very open 
during the project about our dual role as critical friends and researchers, and our 
predisposition to theory-driven approaches. However, our ability to maintain a critical 
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distance was challenged: we came to respect and like the practitioners, and appreciate the 
herculean nature of their task and the progress they made. Given that our task here is not to 
evaluate their work, but rather to examine the processes by which evaluation was shaped, 
this lack of distance is, we believe, relatively unimportant, and outweighed by the benefits 
of unusually good access to the field (cf. Patton 2015).  
We present our account as a narrative in three chronological stages, through which we trace 
the evolution and relative ‘fates’ of (broadly) quantitative, qualitative and theory-driven 
approaches to evaluation. These stages follow the structure of the evaluation activities 
within the project: 
A. an initial phase of working out how the project could and should be evaluated; 
B. the execution of this, culminating in the evaluation report of the ‘Winter Planning’ 
activities; and, 
C. the second-year extension of a slimmed-down project, ending with the final evaluation 
report.    
At each stage we present a tabular summary of the legitimacy of contending methodologies 
in terms of Beetham’s three dimensions of rules, justifying beliefs and consent. 
The early months: how should the project be evaluated?  
Early project team meetings exposed serious concerns about which evaluation 
methodologies would be acceptable within the team, and to other stakeholders, as ways of 
generating authoritative knowledge.  This puzzling over legitimacy can usefully be 
summarised in terms of five questions:  
 Why was the project to be evaluated?  The team were unanimous that the key goal 
was to inform better service provision, but demonstrating cost neutrality or savings 
was also essential. 
 What was to be evaluated?  The whole project and its overall outcomes, the 
outcomes of specific component interventions, or the process?  
 Who would evaluate, given that the allocated resource for evaluation was a single 
team member?   
 When was it to be evaluated?  Was there a need for a plan from the outset, or could 
the evaluation evolve with the project?   
 Finally, how was it to be evaluated?  Were numbers needed, and if so would these 
measure financial or other resource savings, or the health and wellbeing of 
residents?  If not numbers, then what? 
Underlying these was a deeper concern. In the context of funding cuts, the team feared that 
service integration might simply be used to reduce costs, rather than maintain or improve 
service quality. They were committed to achieving the latter, and so wanted an evaluation 
of quality as well as cost - yet achieving this appeared to them to be beset by a fundamental 
problem. They recognised that the accepted ‘rules’ for policy evaluation were to assess 
outcomes quantitatively, justifiable both as the usual, taken-for-granted correct process and 
by their specific need for a costed ‘business case’. As the project sponsor put it, ‘in crude 
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terms what ‘The System’ needs to know is if the investment in the community-support 
workers is more than paid back’7. Yet the team also believed that showing relevant, 
significant changes in spending and attributing these conclusively to project activities was 
unlikely.  
Conversely, from the outset they agreed that showing quick, positive results from specific 
interventions for individual service users would not be difficult, yet that despite the 
‘immense power in the individual stories’ this would not be legitimate evidence in the eyes 
of the people who would be making decisions about resources. As the first Evidence Base & 
Evaluation workstream lead said to a project meeting,  
we’ll have to do a lot of work with the Board, because I’m not sure they’ll accept 
[stories] as being enough, because how can you measure the cost-benefit of that, 
because it’s the value to the person? 
Beetham’s criterion is that rules should be justifiable ‘by reference to shared beliefs’. The 
problem for the project team was that although within the group they shared a belief in 
stories as evidence, they also believed that qualitative evaluation was not legitimate for 
other key stakeholders. Such beliefs were surprisingly widespread: some of those attributed 
(by others) with a need for numbers, including economists and statisticians, also expressed 
a belief in the value of qualitative evaluation. In turn they projected a need for ‘hard 
quantitative data’ onto service commissioners and, ultimately, the UK Treasury.  
Although at this early stage we suggested that a causal approach might be useful, this was 
dismissed: it was unjustifiable according to the team’s existing beliefs about evaluation. In 
an early meeting the project manager bluntly declared that ‘if we’re honest this cause and 
effect thing is never going to be demonstrated’. Clearly our beliefs, and status as academics, 
carried little weight.  
At the outset two basic positions thus emerged as candidate legitimate answers to the 
what? and how? questions: quantitative evaluation of overall outcomes, and qualitative 
accounts of individuals’ experiences. These were not conflicting ‘sides’ in a debate, nor was 
there any clear leadership to bring about a resolution – everyone seemed genuinely 
undecided, and committed to puzzling out the best evaluation methodology. 
Table 1 summarises this early situation in terms of Beetham’s dimensions: both positions 




                                                     
7 Quotations have been used relatively sparsely in this text: in the nature of the discussions in the meetings 
and wide-ranging interviews there were rarely self-explanatory fragments of speech. We have selected 
phrases which are representative and intelligible to illustrate and reinforce the points being made.  
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Evaluation Approach  Rules  Justifying Principles  Consent  
Quantitative 
evaluation of overall 
project by trained 
evaluator  
Measures of costs, 
service provision, 
user satisfaction; 
applied at beginning 
and end of project  
Principled: the 
validity of 
quantitative data as 
objective, scientific 
evidence    
Pragmatic: the need 
for evidence of cost 
savings  
Explicit consent was 













primarily of service 
users but also of 
project workers  
Principled: reliability 
of accounts.  
Pragmatic: provide 
useful information 
on actual project 
impacts and of how 
these come about  
Explicit consent was 
high, but heavily 
qualified by 
expectation of low 
legitimacy outside 
the group 
Table 1. Early stages: competing methodologies 
The why? question was addressed by making the evaluation explicitly multifunctional, using 
the device of a ‘balanced scorecard’ (Appendix 1), which positioned cost savings as 
outcomes alongside benefits to clients, operational change, and organisational learning. This 
approach was introduced by the project’s most senior NHS officer, and carried the authority 
of use within the NHS, and its authorship by a recognised academic evaluation expert (see 
Moullin 2009). The scorecard could thus be adopted as defining a set of rules which both 
satisfied the team’s belief that substantive outcomes mattered more than cost savings, and 
could also be expected to have external legitimacy. More or less simultaneously an 
organisational solution was devised which made it possible to avoid confronting directly the 
who? what? and how? problems. (When? was resolved by default, as the project started 
before evaluation was sorted out.) The solution was to split evaluation into two strands, 
carried out in different ways by different groups. This was set out in the project’s 
Overarching Evaluation Framework (April 2012):   
The Balanced Scorecard approach will be used to assess the overall impact of the 
numerous interventions in Lyndon. Each of the individual interventions will undertake 
their own evaluations independently. 
While the Framework defined the Scorecard and its indicators, it did not specify how the 
separate intervention evaluations were to be done, nor what indicators they should use.  
The overall evaluation was assigned to the Evidence Base & Evaluation workstream, with a 
trained statistician as its new lead, and was thus separated from the five implementation 
workstreams. The task was technically challenging. In the absence of suitable 
neighbourhoods as controls, comparison of outcomes in Lyndon with the average for the 
city received widespread consent as a meaningful measure, in part because it was seen to 
partially solve the attribution problem. If it could be shown that since the project started 
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Lyndon outcomes were ‘better’ than the city overall, then it would seem reasonable to 
attribute this to the collective impact of the project interventions. This might tell decision 
makers that the Project as a whole was worth replicating elsewhere, though it was 
recognised that it ‘would be an analysis of the group effect rather than a cause and effect 
methodology for each of the individual activities’ (Overview of Balanced Scorecard and 
Planned Work, April 2012). 
The middle stage: conviction without proof? 
Designing the overall evaluation took many months. Meanwhile, the evaluation of the 
separate interventions developed in two parallel ways. While the puzzling continued over 
how to explicitly prove the worth of the project’s various components to external 
audiences, the team engaged in an extremely effective evaluative process. Never named as 
‘evaluation’, it was a set of practices of reporting and learning which informed project 
development.  
The explicit evaluation. The project’s managers went back to its hypothesis (Page XX above) 
and re-presented this as a matrix (Appendix 2) of 17 outcomes allocated to 15 activities, in 
order to generate a collective understanding of how the parts of the project related to the 
hypothesis. The matrix also provided a basis for monitoring progress, and so for evaluating 
it. In contrast, we (the authors) tried to use the hypothesis as the basis for explicit 
development of a ToC, identifying pathways from inputs to outcomes. In Beetham’s terms, 
although we had yet to work out rules for carrying out an evaluation based on this, the 
justifying principle was clear to us: the ‘standard argument’ for TDE that causal reasoning 
would show how process and outcomes were connected, and link individual interventions 
with the overall outcomes (Berriet-Solliec et al. 2014). Moreover, this approach was 
legitimised for us by its academic standing – something only we were aware of. 
In a rare explicit discussion of competing methodologies, these two proposals were put to a 
team meeting. The matrix was introduced as a management and evaluation tool, legitimised 
by its transparency and simplicity, its grounding in the hypothesis, and by being proposed by 
the project managers. The Balanced Scorecard was defended by the Evaluation workstream 
lead on the grounds that it had been approved by the Project Board, and that overall 
outcomes could not be abandoned in favour of process measures. It was agreed that the 
two were complementary. Our theory-based approach was hardly discussed, and withdrawn 
on the grounds that adding another table was unhelpful. Its obvious (to us) superiority in 
evaluative power was insufficient to command the consent of the others: the rules were 
unfamiliar and comparatively complex, and academic standing insufficient on its own to 
legitimise our proposal. The enduring result was to embed a patchwork approach to 
evaluation, using a wide range of methods and a mix of qualitative and quantitative 
evidence, and eschewing causal attribution. Board meeting minutes, a few months later, 
note that  
It is sometimes difficult when evaluating the whole programme to attribute which 
intervention/s met the outcome/s. The hypothesis is about doing a number of 
 14 
 
interventions at once to improve outcomes. All projects in the programme are being 
evaluated to ensure that there is evidence of their effectiveness. Very direct 
attribution is not always possible though. 
Yet, despite our private frustration, this approach was ultimately successful.  
It was exemplified by the internal evaluation of the project’s first intervention. ‘Winter 
Planning’ involved support workers visiting ‘at risk’ adults to discuss with them how they 
would cope in the event of a heavy snowfall. The evaluation report was based on the team’s 
reflections, along with responses to structured interviews with clients. It was largely 
qualitative, with a single quantitative section on the impact on clients and their satisfaction. 
Throughout it was enlivened with quotations and vignettes of individuals’ lives; a long, 
separate section presented individual case stories. These were not illustrative of a 
quantitative evaluative core: they were the core, with a rhetorical force exemplified by the 
report’s front cover, which quoted ‘Mrs K’ as saying “Knowing somebody cares if you live or 
die during these dark, cold winter months means everything.”  
Tacit evaluation practices. These stories emerged from the most effective, but least visible, 
evaluation practices. The project management’s concern with learning and improvement 
meant that every report by the support workers, and the discussions from every meeting, 
fed into a continuous, unstructured reflective examination and use of evidence. Some of this 
not only guided further action, but was also repeatedly reproduced to support the case for 
the project. This evidence was almost entirely stories about individuals in the community – 
of how they had responded to interventions by the project, or conversely of how the state 
had failed to intervene effectively in their lives (Box 1 paraphrases a typical, much-used 
example.) 
These stories were re-told at every level 
from support worker supervisions through 
to city-scale design workshops for Getting 
It Right. They were emotionally powerful 
(Hoch 2006): funny, dismaying, 
reassuring, capable of moving senior 
professional audiences to public tears. 
The team were well aware of this power: 
as the project manager told the Board, 
“you can make the biggest impact with a 
story, a case, no matter how uninspired 
uninterested people are”. While they 
were often shocking, the stories gained 
credibility through confirming the 
‘common sense’ that services were currently inefficient and that change for the better was 
possible. The stories worked as practical evaluations: they convinced everyone involved that 
effective and cheap service integration could be achieved fairly straightforwardly, through 
Box 1: A typical, much repeated story. 
The local authority had removed a roadside 
bench in Lyndon.  Unknowingly this 
effectively trapped a frail elderly couple in 
their house, as they couldn’t take their daily 
walk to the daycare centre without a rest. 
The Lyndon Project community support 
workers discovered this; the multi-
disciplinary team passed on the message 
within the local authority; the bench was 
replaced. Now the couple can again go and 
have their sausage roll at the centre – the 
only time they ever get out of their house.  
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community support workers linked to cross-sectoral teams, built up organically as needs 
were uncovered and trust was built between workers. 
Strikingly, the stories’ legitimacy as evidence for the success of this ‘Lyndon way of working’ 
went beyond the Project. Their repetition effectively shaped action within the much larger 
Getting It Right project, convincing both its chief executive and some general practitioners. 
The latter started taking on community support workers to start Lyndon-like programmes 
without any quantitative evidence: senior NHS managers were described to the Board as 
being ‘quite nervous’ that ‘demand from GPs has overtaken the evaluation’. It also surprised 
the local authority staff, who stereotyped ‘the bean counters in Health’ with a highly 
problematic need for quantitative data. However, echoing Gawande (2010), Getting it 
Right’s chief executive suggested in an interview that the dominance of quantitative 
evaluation in the NHS was counterbalanced by a professional disposition amongst clinicians 
towards the evidential value of individual case histories. More bluntly the project lead 
credited the GPs with ‘common bloody sense’.  
At the end of the first year we can summarise the evaluation processes as shown in Table 2, 
with three methodologies sufficiently legitimate to be running in parallel, and TDE excluded.  
Evaluation Approach  Rules  Justification  Consent  






Pragmatic: needed finer-grain 
evidence of impact than overall 
evaluation provided, and any kind 
of evidence seemed to be 
convincing  









Principled: an accepted way to 
evaluate across multiple 
objectives 
Pragmatic: would generate 
quantitative outcomes data for 
the business case and service 
improvements  
Authority: sanctioned by NHS use 
and academic source 
High in principle, 
but carried 
little/no weight in 
practice  
Stories  Testimony of 
change from 
clients or front-
line workers   
Principled: truthfulness and 
authenticity of accounts 
Pragmatic: rhetorical 
effectiveness in convincing 
people the approach worked 




Theory of change  Interview-based 
causal narratives  
Principled and pragmatic: 
providing proof of ‘what worked’ 
required causal understanding 
Authority: academic status of TDE 
Low, apart from 
the authors  
Table 2: Parallel evaluation practices  
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The mature stage: a simple, effective project 
During the middle stage little progress was made in several of the workstreams, and activity 
narrowed to developing the ‘Lyndon way of working’. Senior managers decided to continue 
the project for a second year, focusing on this approach and its evaluation. The enduring 
legitimacy tension is clear. Continuation was based on the conviction of the Board and those 
they reported to that they had sufficient evidence that the approach was working. Yet they 
also believed that the evidence was insufficient to support a final decision about either long-
term continuation or scaling up. For this they needed the crucial cost data to make ‘the 
business case’, particularly if Getting It Right were to adopt the approach formally.  
The evaluation was developed within the project team and through informal meetings 
between ourselves and the managers, reflecting the trust that was developing and our 
increasing status as usefully critical friends. The resulting plan was for a multi-strand 
evaluation, comprising: 
 quantitative measures of health and social care outcomes  
 the collection of as many case stories as was practicable and analysing these for causal 
patterns 
 an interview-based investigation of causal processes from the perspective of the 
steering group and project managers, conducted by ourselves.  
Compared to the Winter Planning evaluation, there was significantly more emphasis on 
producing quantitative data, albeit rather grudgingly. As a senior officer put it, ‘I don’t like 
that it’s numbers but I understand, and it might be a way of shifting resources from health 
to social care.’ TDE also gained some legitimacy.  The intention to collect and analyse 
significant numbers of case stories, rather than just to use the most striking ones, was 
intended to develop robust and fine-grained causal accounts of how the project worked 
(Dodge et al. 2005). The project managers had clearly shifted their position on the value of 
such analyses, even if they would not commit to framing the evaluation around a 
comprehensive ToC.   
At this point the quantitative, outcome indicators re-emerged in ways which challenged 
earlier negative assumptions about their feasibility and value. The Evaluation workstream 
produced figures showing that, since the project had started, Lyndon had bucked city trends 
for unscheduled hospital admissions. In response, concerned that this quantitative evidence 
was dominated by health outcomes (and despite her aversion to quantification) the project 
lead produced data showing the neighbourhood also bucking trends on the average age at 
which care packages were taken up. The latter was particularly valuable, as credible 
attribution (Mayne 2012) was easy, with a very short causal chain from we did this for an 
individual to they didn’t need a care package this year. The financial implications were 
startling, as the high cost of each package implied huge savings, sufficient to pay for the 
community support workers many times over.  
The project lead’s final evaluation report contained most of the proposed elements, as well 
as the projected city-wide savings, despite her misgivings that these were ‘too good to be 
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true’. The systematic analysis of multiple stories was excluded. Time and resources ran out, 
and in any case she believed it was unnecessary to push the boundaries of locally-
acceptable evaluation methods in this way. As the report put it, 
the evaluation approach has been to collect a range of evidence to build up a picture 
of the change and impact of the work. No single piece of evidence is conclusive but 
the combined picture provides a body of evidence for commissioners to use to inform 
future decision making (Lyndon Way of Working, Evaluation, September 2013) 
The overall product was thus a legitimate patchwork, with different rules for different parts 
of the evaluation, justifiable by a corresponding range of principles. There was no single 
underlying rationality: or rather, the rationality was that of evaluation as craft. The project 
lead and her team had successfully constructed an ‘intelligible picture’ (Sanderson 2000: 
449) (summarised in Table 3), using data of the right kinds, reported in an appropriate way, 
to do the required task of convincing an already sympathetic audience that the Lyndon way 
of working was a success.  
 







stories of process  
Pragmatic: it worked! 
This was conclusive in 
the appropriate 






inductive ‘Theory of 
Change’  
Accumulating 
individual stories to 
become more than 
‘just anecdotes’; 
identifying patterns 





principled: every bit 
of data can be used 
as evidence and 
cumulatively they can 
tell a convincing story 
which explains the 
unexpected 
outcomes figures  
Insufficient to be 
used, but rising 
amongst key staff  
Table 3.  The final report and the possible emergence of TDE    
 
Conclusions 
The overall story of evaluation in Lyndon is one of practitioners crafting a workable 
approach in the face of the indeterminate and competing legitimacy claims of different 
methodologies.  At the outset there seemed to them no given, single set of rules for how to 
do an evaluation which would meet their needs for learning and accountability. Resolution 
lay in breaking the evaluation into methodologically and organisationally distinct parts, 
underpinned by different rationalities. These were then assembled into a multi-facetted 
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approach which commanded sufficient external legitimacy for the ‘Lyndon way of working’ 
to be mainstreamed after the project’s end, and in part adopted across the city by the much 
larger Getting It Right programme. Reaching this point was supported by continuous, tacit, 
qualitative evaluation practices which enabled learning and development within the project 
while generating rhetorically powerful, convincing narratives for external audiences. Hearts 
and minds were being won over by informal practices at the same time as people struggled 
to formulate a publicly legitimate evaluation approach.  
This struggle was one of engaged and reflexive practice, and significant shifts in what 
constituted accepted rules and justifying principles (Beetham 1991) took place over the 
project’s 30-month life. Central to the struggle was the tension between the legitimacy of 
designs based on familiar, accepted methodologies and legitimacy based on utility, with the 
former tending to reduce usability (Saunders 2012). Three aspects are of particular interest.  
Firstly, quantitative evaluation had little traction until late in the project, when its utility was 
established. The Lyndon project team were not ‘everyday positivists’. They were sceptical 
about outcomes measures, and were well aware of the attribution problem created by 
complexity and of the problem of showing quantitative results in a city-scale comparison. 
Their rationality was more instinctively interpretivist, with ‘gut feelings’ for the power of 
narrative. However, they simultaneously subscribed to the view that everyday positivism is 
dominant, and so displaced the need for numbers onto Others. It thus remained crucial in 
creating legitimacy (Johnson et al. 2006).  
Secondly, in practice the most powerful methodology was that which was believed to be 
weakest in public. Telling and retelling an individual story (provided it followed tacit rules of 
relevance and truthfulness) had de facto legitimacy as a way of evaluating the success of the 
project, with sufficient authority to be the basis for significant decisions - the antithesis of 
stereotypical evidence-based policy making. 
Thirdly, practitioners’ response to the complexity of the real world was not to attempt to 
theorise it explicitly, and theory-based approaches had little legitimacy at first, echoing 
Sullivan and Stewart’s findings that ‘[i]n the field, discussion of “ToC” induced little interest’ 
(2006: 192). However, over time the Lyndon managers developed an explicit interest in 
causal theory, although this remained inessential to their craft: the patchwork approach was 
successful without recourse to theoretical underpinning.  
How general might these findings be? The Lyndon Project is plausibly an exemplar of a fairly 
typical situation: of intelligent, experienced people working in a very complex and dynamic 
environment, trying both to deliver a complex intervention and evaluate it. Though one 
would expect different outcomes in different settings (for instance where practitioners were 
less averse to numbers) we suggest that the processes involved are likely to be similar 
elsewhere (Maxwell 2012: 141). There is clearly a need for further research to explore this 
further and corroborate our claims (Sayer 1992: 246), and in particular to clarify what is 
context-specific detail unique to this case, and what is more general. 
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In particular, using ‘legitimacy’ seems a fruitful new way (Siggelkow 2007) to understand in 
detail ‘how’ and ‘why’ evaluations evolve over time. Following Beetham (1991) in separating 
out the rules, their justifying principles and the consent they command, we can show how 
issues of use and usability are intimately and complexly connected (Saunders 2012). 
Legitimacy in evaluation is more than simply people believing in the utility of a particular 
methodology. It may rest on all of: the in-principle acceptability of an evaluation on 
methodological grounds (particularly if this is reinforced by authoritative external 
endorsement); whether it is done well and follows the relevant rules correctly; and on 
whether it is acceptable to the relevant audience(s) on the grounds that it provides useful, 
usable knowledge in that context. The approach also allows the different kinds of uses 
noted by Weiss (1979) to be analysed alongside each other. While an evaluation may be 
useful because it creates usable knowledge (Saunders 2012), other uses may be as or more 
important in justifying evaluation design in any given context – for instance the need to 
achieve wider legitimacy by producing numbers for external ‘bean counters’.  
This has practical implications for evaluators, who should pay attention to legitimacy, and be 
open minded on how it is conferred. Encouragingly, we suggest that the force of everyday 
positivism should not be overestimated, and that even where it is publically professed it 
may not be dominant in practice. Moreover, because legitimacy rests on all three 
dimensions of rules, justifiability and consent, it is not inherently stable. Change is probably 
(almost) always possible, and in particular we highlight the possibility for learning during the 
course of an evaluation. It may well be fruitful to promote such learning, through providing 
opportunities for experimentation and reflection.  
Finally, we turn to the issue of whether an evaluation needs to be, or can be, underpinned 
by a single rationality, and what the role of CR-based TDE might be. The Lyndon case shows 
that such coherence is not a necessary condition for success, and suggests that a pragmatic 
patchwork of different methods is a feasible approach in this kind of context, being both 
effective and legitimate. Achieving a successful patchwork requires flexibility – the ability 
and willingness to respond to emerging knowledge, changing demands for knowledge and 
stakeholders’ responses both to the substance and form of evaluation. Of course, this 
approach in itself must establish its legitimacy: while it worked in Lyndon it might well face 
legitimacy problems in other contexts. Thus it will need to be argued for, have its usefulness 
demonstrated, and itself be evaluated.  
It was very evident in Lyndon, and presumably elsewhere, that evaluations are themselves 
interventions in complex and dynamic settings, and so subject to the same complexity: 
multiple goals, poorly defined boundaries, changing understandings and so on. Given this, 
the ‘rules’ of TDE – in particular establishing a ToC at the outset (Ling 2012) – reveal an 
incongruity between the approach’s recognition of the complexity of policy making and its 
assumption that evaluators can organise an evaluation based in a single rationality. 
These points might appear to reinforce a turn to pragmatism as the overall rationality for 
evaluation as craft, as Sanderson (2000) seems to suggest. However, we end on a positive 
note from the perspective of those who, like us, believe that causal explanation is the 
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bedrock of effective evaluation. On the one hand it is clear that causal theorising can be a 
legitimate component of a patchwork - where, for instance, short, unambiguous causal 
chains are present (cf.Sullivan and Stewart 2006, who note that practitioners often see the 
value of causal explanation.)  On the other, more speculatively, we suggest that critical 
realist, theory-driven evaluation can act as a guide to the craft of developing successful 
patchworks – an underlying rationality which can incorporate different kinds of process and 
outcome data (Morton 2003; Connelly and Anderson 2007), and into which more explicit 
causal elements can be introduced if/when these gain legitimacy with an evaluation’s 
audience(s). In such an approach, full Theories of Change act as regulatory ideals – not in 
themselves possible, but informing feasible, practically-adequate theorising. Our pragmatic 
goal should perhaps be to achieve evaluations which are more and increasingly theory-
driven, rather than 100% theory-driven.  
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Appendix 1: Lyndon Overarching Evaluation Framework 
The Balanced Scorecard approach will be used to assess the overall impact of the numerous 






What learning is required 
to sustain the project & 
innovate development?
Client perspective
What do clients  / 
stakeholders want from 
the project?
Financial perspective
How well does the 
project manage costs 
and resources?
Operational perspective
What ‘business processes’ are 
needed to achieve the aim of 
the project?
Strategic Aim
By having integrated services and place-based resources, 
assets and budgets combined with robust individual and 
community resilience, the health, wellbeing and 
independence of older and vulnerable people will improve, 
quality of service will rise and cost will reduce.
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Appendix 2 Lyndon planning matrix: the middle phase 
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Issues/ other work  ↓ 
Access to information  X  X    X      X X X 
Getting around safely X              X 
Improved home care 
services 
 X  X  X          
Safety X               
Reliable trades people, 
cleaners and volunteers 
  X    X   X X   X  
Support with day to day X X X        X    X 
Lack of contact with 
neighbours 
X  X     X       X 
Key worker X X  X X X X X X X X X   X 
Integrated services X X  X X X  X X       
Resilience - community X X X X      X X X  X X 
Self care X X  X           X 
Risk stratification X    X X         X 
Whole household 
approach 
X   X  X  X X       
Theatre work        X        
Open spaces                
Neighbourhood 
appraisal/plan 
    X X       X   
Learning and doing X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
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